



# Mark Scheme (Results)

Summer 2023

Pearson Edexcel  
In GCE History (9HI0/1E)  
Advanced

Paper 1: Breadth study with  
interpretations

Option 1E: Communist states in the  
twentieth century

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## General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

## Generic Level Descriptors: Sections A and B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic.</li> <li>Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question.</li> <li>The overall judgement is missing or asserted.</li> <li>There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.</li> </ul>
2	4–7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question.</li> <li>Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question.</li> <li>An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit.</li> <li>The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.</li> </ul>
3	8–12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included.</li> <li>Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth.</li> <li>Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation.</li> <li>The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.</li> </ul>
4	13–16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven.</li> <li>Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands.</li> <li>Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported.</li> <li>The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.</li> </ul>
5	17–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period.</li> <li>Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands.</li> <li>Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement.</li> <li>The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.</li> </ul>

## Section C

Target: AO3: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate.</li> <li>• Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts.</li> <li>• Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence.</li> </ul>
2	4–7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate.</li> <li>• Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included.</li> <li>• A judgement is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues.</li> </ul>
3	8–12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences.</li> <li>• Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts.</li> <li>• A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.</li> </ul>
4	13–16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by comparison of them.</li> <li>• Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth.</li> <li>• Discusses evidence provided in the extracts in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.</li> </ul>
5	17–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors.</li> <li>• Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments.</li> <li>• Presents sustained evaluative argument, reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.</li> </ul>

## Section A: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	<p><b>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</b></p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that <b>Stalin's industrial and agricultural policies</b> were the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that <b>Stalin's industrial and agricultural policies were the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53</b> should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Stalin's 'socialism in one country' (Five-Year Plans and collectivisation)</b> was deemed more realistic than world revolution and this created a support base among the party rank and file and patriotic Soviet workers</li> <li>• <b>Stalin's pre-war Five-Year Plans</b> turned the USSR into a modern industrial state with an economic base strong enough to withstand the Nazi threat (1941–45) and therefore preserve his rule</li> <li>• Collectivisation in the 1930s strengthened <b>Stalin's hold</b> on power by imposing greater economic and political controls over the peasantry, a key source of opposition to communist rule</li> <li>• The Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans successfully restored the Soviet economy after the dislocation of war (e.g. urban living standards improved from 1948), thereby stabilising <b>Stalin's power</b>.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that other factors were the main reason/<b>Stalin's industrial and agricultural policies</b> were not the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stalin relied heavily on terror, coercion and intimidation to retain power throughout this period, e.g. the purges of the 1930s and the use of similar tactics after 1945</li> <li>• Stalin retained power by creating and controlling a party-government machine that enforced a rigid culture of loyalty/obedience to the leader and removed real and perceived opponents</li> <li>• <b>Stalin's control over the media and his promotion of socialist realist art</b> strengthened his power by motivating the committed with a vision of the USSR moving towards the 'perfect' socialist society</li> <li>• <b>During this period, Stalin's increasingly extensive 'cult of personality'</b> propaganda campaign reinforced his personal power and contributed to his popular image as the saviour of socialism and Mother Russia in 1945</li> <li>• <b>Stalin's forced economic modernisation generated considerable popular opposition</b>, e.g. state-imposed collectivisation led to famine in 1932–33 and many peasants resisted by destroying their farms and livestock.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
2	<p><b>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</b></p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that <b>Khrushchev's attempts to reform Soviet</b> government were largely successful.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that <b>Khrushchev's attempts to reform Soviet</b> government were largely successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Khrushchev ended Stalinist government terror, e.g. 2 million political prisoners were released between 1953 and 1960; by 1961 half of those who had been executed under Stalin were posthumously rehabilitated</li> <li>• Through de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev succeeded in ending Stalin's system of personal rule and this enabled the party to gain a new level of authority in relation to the Soviet leader</li> <li>• Between 1953 and 1956, Khrushchev replaced 50 per cent of the regional party secretaries and 44 per cent of the central committee; these personnel changes created a more reform-minded senior Soviet leadership</li> <li>• Khrushchev's 'democratisation' reform increased party membership from 6.9 million (1954) to 11 million (1964); this raised worker-peasant membership to 60 per cent, strengthening the regime's 'proletarian' political base.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and <b>evidence that Khrushchev's attempts to reform Soviet</b> government were not successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation measures were limited (e.g. no public rejection of Stalin's legacy or admission of his crimes) and created instability within the Soviet bloc, e.g. Poland and Hungary</li> <li>• Under pressure from Stalinists and some moderates in the party who objected to the scale/pace of de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev backtracked in 1957 and publicly acknowledged that all communists were Stalinists</li> <li>• Khrushchev's introduction of fixed three-year terms for senior communists created great resentment among party officials who feared for their power and privileges; this opposition contributed to Khrushchev's downfall in 1964</li> <li>• Khrushchev's moves to decentralise decision-making by transferring powers from central ministries to regional councils provoked serious opposition from the 'Anti-Party Group' (1957), which attempted to oust him.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

## Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	<p>Answers will be credited according to <b>candidates' deployment</b> of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Soviet policy on religion under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different from Soviet policy on religion under Khrushchev and Brezhnev.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that Soviet policy on religion under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different from Soviet policy on religion under Khrushchev and Brezhnev should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lenin and Stalin were prepared to employ terror methods against religion to achieve communist objectives whereas Khrushchev and Brezhnev were not, e.g. priests were killed in the Red Terror of 1921-22 and the purges of 1936-39</li> <li>• Unlike Lenin and Stalin, who were prepared to make pragmatic accommodations with religion when necessary, Khrushchev pursued a consistently harsh anti-religious policy throughout his leadership</li> <li>• Brezhnev was more tolerant of the Orthodox church than either Lenin or Stalin because he was aware that religious persecution alienated Western opinion and complicated the conduct of Soviet foreign policy</li> <li>• Unlike Lenin and Stalin, Brezhnev placed great emphasis on the philosophy of atheism and supported Islam <b>as a 'progressive, anti-colonial and revolutionary creed' that</b> was potentially anti-American in orientation.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that Soviet policy on religion under Lenin and Stalin was similar to Soviet policy on religion under Khrushchev and Brezhnev should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As Marxists, all four leaders pursued policies that were ideologically opposed to religion and its institutions because such belief systems threatened to undermine socialist values and communist control</li> <li>• All four leaders engaged in the persecution of religious personnel throughout the period, e.g. the detention of Patriarch Tikhon (1918) and Father Yakunin (1979) and by 1939 only 12 bishops were at liberty</li> <li>• Before and after 1953, Soviet leaders attempted to dismantle the infrastructure of organised religion during this period, e.g. the destruction or conversion of churches under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev</li> <li>• Before and after 1953, Soviet leaders used propaganda/education to weaken public attachment to religion, e.g. the Militant Godless (Stalin), the space programme (Khrushchev) and science education (Brezhnev).</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>



Question	Indicative content
4	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how successful the attempts of the Soviet regime were to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85 were successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The terms and conditions of employment for Soviet workers encouraged stability, e.g. job security, a minimum wage (1956), a shorter working week (1957) and real wage increases (50 per cent between 1967-77)</li> <li>• The extension of healthcare provision from the 1950s also had a stabilising effect since medical services were now readily available to the Soviet population, e.g. the spread of polyclinics and sanatoria</li> <li>• Soviet society was also stabilised by Khrushchev's extensive housing programme, which increased the number of modern dwellings and offered better living conditions for many people</li> <li>• Between 1950 and 1980 state welfare spending increased by 500 per cent and this helped to stabilise society by partly addressing the issue of poverty.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that the attempts of the Soviet regime to promote a stable society in the years 1953-85 were not successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full employment was no guarantee of stability in the Soviet Union since many had undemanding, repetitive or essentially pointless jobs and annual labour turnover often reached 30 per cent</li> <li>• In spite of increased investment in healthcare, the health of sections of the Soviet population declined, which undermined social stability, e.g. infant mortality rates increased from 3 to 7 per cent in the 1970s</li> <li>• <b>Government 'stabilising' measures could not prevent serious worker unrest</b> in Temirtau (1959), protests over food prices (1962), and strikes and riots over food shortages in Sverdlovsk (1969) and Gorki (1980)</li> <li>• Social problems persisted, which had a detrimental effect on social cohesion, e.g. alcohol consumption increased by 600 per cent in the years 1940-80 and, in 1979, 34 per cent of marriages ended in divorce.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

## Section C: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
5	<p><b>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment</b> of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians <b>is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints</b> in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the 'rise of the national question'.</p> <p>In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gorbachev failed to deal with growing nationalist feeling in the republics which was fanned by a more tolerant media environment</li> <li>• Nationalist feeling in the Baltic states led to protests and the formation of popular front organisations which influenced the actions of other republics</li> <li>• The collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc, due to Gorbachev's non-intervention, boosted nationalist feeling in, and the confidence of, the Soviet republics.</li> </ul> <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gorbachev's spending in 1985-86 undermined Soviet financial stability; his policies failed to grasp the seriousness of the nationalist tensions within the USSR</li> <li>• He undermined the Communist Party but remained convinced that the Soviet Union could not abandon the socialist path; he failed to support the Shatalin programme in 1990</li> <li>• Gorbachev failed to recognise that the Soviet system rested on compulsion and dishonest propaganda.</li> </ul> <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the 'rise of the national question'. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Popular nationalist agendas in the republics were strengthened by Gorbachev's cadre-change and anti-corruption initiatives which led to the appointment of Russian local leaders</li> <li>• By 1988 large popular front independence movements were growing in all three Baltic states; in 1990 the three Popular Fronts declared independence after each achieved a majority in Supreme Soviet elections</li> <li>• Centrifugal nationalist forces within the USSR were encouraged by the fall of communist regimes in Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1988-90, facilitated by Gorbachev's 'Sinatra doctrine'</li> <li>• Nationalist demands were fuelled by <i>glasnost</i>, which exposed Stalin's treatment of non-Russian peoples, revealed higher Western living standards and permitted pro-nationalist/autonomy propaganda.</li> </ul> <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the 'rise of the national question'. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gorbachev's 'acceleration' programme doubled the Soviet deficit, in GDP</li> </ul>

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	<p>terms, in 1985-86, weakening the economy; his rejection of the Shatalin programme (1990) blocked much-needed market economy reforms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gorbachev's attempts to create a new union in 1990-91 were derailed by the nationalists' momentum, e.g. the Ukrainian vote for independence and the Minsk agreement</li> <li>• Although Gorbachev wanted to create a Soviet socialist 'commonwealth', his amendment of Article 6 led to multi-party politics and effectively rendered the CPSU powerless by late 1990</li> <li>• As a product of the USSR, Gorbachev was too influenced by the Soviet system to undertake root and branch reform, e.g. his reluctance to abandon central planning and his limited conception of <i>glasnost</i>.</li> </ul>